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Abstract
Motivated in part by the problem of secure multicast distributed storage, we analyze secrecy rates
for a channel in which two transmitters simultaneously multicast to two receivers in the presence of an
eavesdropper. Achievable rates are calculated via extensions of a technique due to Chia and El Gamal and
also the method of output statistics of random binning. An intriguing synergy is observed between the
achievable rate expressions arising from the two techniques: the rate region of the latter is simplified via
a constraint that is discovered while deriving the former rate region. Outer bounds are derived for both
the degraded and non-degraded versions of the channel, and examples are provided in which the inner
and outer bounds meet. The inner bounds recover known results for the multiple-access wiretap channel,
broadcast channel with confidential messages, and the compound MAC channel. An auxiliary result is
also produced that characterizes the minimal randomness necessary to achieve secrecy in multiple-access
wiretap channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Ahlswede calculated the capacity of a channel with two senders and two receivers in a
work [1] that proved highly influential for the MAC channel [2] and the interference channel [3].
We study the corresponding secrecy problem (Fig. 1), in which both transmitters send messages
simultaneously to both receivers in the presence of an eavesdropper, and all senders, receivers,
and eavesdropper are at different terminals. This problem is motivated in part by secure access
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Fig. 1. Two-sender two-receiver channel with an eavesdropper
of multiple users to data in a distributed cache, which is a multi-transmitter (multiple-access)
multicast scenario [4], [5]. This problem is also equivalent to a compound two-state multiple-
access wiretap channel. It has been known [6] that problems involving compound channels
have an equivalent multicast representation, in which the channel to each multicast receiver is
equivalent to one of the states of the compound channel.
In recent years the study of strong and semantic secrecy has gained momentum [7], [8],
motivated by its operational significance and enabled by the introduction and/or increased pop-
ularity of new achievability techniques such as resolvability [9]–[11] and output statistics of
random binning (OSRB) [12]. Strong secrecy implies weak secrecy, reducing the motivation to
study the latter when the former is tractable. That said, weak secrecy retains interest and utility
because the codebook design techniques that are aimed at weak and strong secrecy can produce
different achievable rate expressions, especially in complex networks. This work studies two
different achievability methods, one of which yields weak secrecy and the other, strong secrecy.
The achievable rate of the latter method is simplified by introducing a constraint that appears
through the derivation of the secrecy region of the former.
These achievability techniques are related to two recent results in network information the-
ory [12], [13]. First, the method of Chia and El Gamal [13] uses Marton coding and indirect
decoding (also known as non-unique decoding) [14] to achieve an improved secrecy rate for
the transmission of a common message to two receivers that may experience different channel
statistics. In particular, [13, Lemma 1] gives an upper bound on the number of codewords
that are typical with an eavesdropper’s received sequence. We extend the method of Chia and
El Gamal to multiple transmitters, and introduce a corresponding two-level Marton-type coding
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3with associated non-unique decoding.
The second method, OSRB [12] (see also [15] for a related approach), analyzes channel
coding problems by conversion to a related source coding problem, where it tests achievability
by probability approximation rather than counting arguments on typical sets. A reverse conversion
is needed to complete the analysis. OSRB is well suited for secrecy problems, which are also
associated with probability approximation. OSRB encoding is purely by random binning and
is enabled by (and named after) the following key result: applying two independent random
binning schemes on the same set, the two bin indices are statistically independent as long as
binning rates are sufficiently small. We extend the tools and techniques of OSRB to match the
requirements of the two-transmitter multicast problem.
In addition to extending, modifying, and adapting these two techniques for a multi-transmitter
setting, our work showcases their relative merit and their relation to each other in a new context.
This is independently of interest because the issue of the relative size of the achievability region
provided by these two techniques has been broached [12], where it was shown that in one specific
problem OSRB can provide a larger achievable rate region, but in a broader sense the question
remains open and is of interest to the community.
Finally, outer bounds for degraded and non-degraded channels are derived and shown to be
tight against inner bounds in some special cases. In addition, the extension of the method of
Chia and El Gamal is utilized to highlight the minimal amount of randomness required to
achieve secrecy rates of the multiple-access wiretap channel, and that therein channel prefixing
can be replaced with superposition, in a manner reminiscent of Watanabe and Oohama [16] for
minimizing the randomness resources for secrecy encoding. Part of the results, including the
proof of the outer bounds, are available in the conference version of this paper [17] and are not
duplicated here in the interest of brevity.
A brief outline of the related literature is as follows. Multicasting with common information in
the presence of an eavesdropper has been studied in [18], [19], deriving inner bounds on secrecy
capacity, and in some special cases also deriving secrecy capacity region. Salehkalaibar et al. [18]
studied a one-receiver, two-eavesdropper broadcast channel with three degraded message sets.
Ekrem and Ulukus [19] studied the transmission of public and confidential messages to two
legitimate users, in the presence of an eavesdropper. Benammar and Piantanida [20] calculated
the secrecy capacity region of some classes of wiretap broadcast channels.
The MAC wiretap channel has been investigated in [21]–[27]. In [21], a discrete memoryless
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4MAC with confidential messages has been studied that consists of a MAC with generalized
feedback [28] where each user’s message must be kept confidential from the other. The multiple
access wiretap channel [22], [23], [27] consists of a MAC with an additional channel output to
an eavesdropper. In [22], [23], achievable rate regions for the secrecy capacity region have been
derived. Secrecy in the interference channel and broadcast channel has been studied in [29],
where inner and outer bounds for the broadcast channel with confidential messages and the
interference channel with confidential messages have been compared.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the notation and the system model.
Section III presents a general inner bound on the secrecy capacity region under the weak
secrecy regime. Section IV produces an outer bound for the degraded model and discusses
its implications. Section V derives a general outer bound and provides an example where this
outer bound is optimal. Section VI presents a general achievable rate region under the strong
secrecy regime.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by capital letters and their realizations by
lower case letters. The set of ǫ−strongly jointly typical sequences of length n, according to pX,Y ,
is denoted by T
(n)
ǫ (pX,Y ). For convenience in notation, whenever there is no danger of confusion,
typicality will reference the random variables rather than the distribution, e.g., T
(n)
ǫ (X, Y ). The
set of sequences {xn : (xn, yn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ (X, Y )} for a fixed yn, when the fixed sequence yn is
clear from the context, is denoted with the shorthand notation T
(n)
ǫ (X|Y ). Superscripts denote
the dimension of a vector, e.g., Xn. The integer set {1, . . . ,M} is denoted by J1,MK, and X[i:j]
indicates the set {Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xj}. The cardinality of a set is denoted by | · |. We utilize the
total variation between probability mass functions (pmfs), defined by ||q − p||1 =
1
2
∑
x |p− q|.
Also, following Cuff [30] we use the concept of random pmfs denoted by capital letters (e.g.
PX).
Definition 1. A (M1,n,M2,n, n) code for the considered model (Fig. 1) consists of the following:
i) Two message sets Wi = J1,Mi,nK, i = 1, 2, from which independent messages W1 and W2
are drawn uniformly distributed over their respective sets.
ii) Stochastic encoders fi, i = 1, 2, which are specified by conditional probability matrices
fi(X
n
i |wi), where X
n
i ∈ X
n
i , wi ∈ Wi are channel inputs and private messages, respectively,
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5and
∑
xni
fi(x
n
i |wi) = 1. Here, fi(x
n
i |wi) is the probability of the encoder producing the
codeword xni for the message wi.
iii) A decoding function φ1 : Y
n
1 →W1 ×W2 that assigns (wˆ1, wˆ2) ∈ J1,M1,nK× J1,M2,nK to
received sequence yn1 .
iv) A decoding function φ2 : Y
n
2 →W1 ×W2 that assigns (wˇ1, wˇ2) ∈ J1,M1,nK× J1,M2,nK to
received sequence yn2 .
The probability of error is given by:
Pe
∆
= P
(
{(Wˆ1, Wˆ2) 6= (W1,W2)} ∪ {(Wˇ1, Wˇ2) 6= (W1,W2)}
)
. (1)
Definition 2 ( [31]). A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable under weak secrecy if there
exists a sequence of (M1,n,M2,n, n) codes with M1,n ≥ 2
nR1 ,M2,n ≥ 2
nR2 , so that Pe
n→∞
−−→ 0
and
1
n
I(W1,W2;Z
n)
n→∞
−−→ 0. (2)
Definition 3. A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable under strong secrecy if there exists
a sequence of (M1,n,M2,n, n) codes with M1,n ≥ 2
nR1 ,M2,n ≥ 2
nR2 , so that Pe
n→∞
−−→ 0 and
I(W1,W2;Z
n)
n→∞
−−→ 0. (3)
Definition 4. pX ≈ qX indicates ‖pX − qX‖1 < ǫ. For two random pmfs [30], PX ≈QX indicates
E‖PX −QX‖1 < ǫ.
III. ACHIEVABLE RATE REGION FOR THE WEAK SECRECY REGIME
We start with a lemma that fits Marton coding with indirect decoding in a MAC structure
and produces an entropy bound needed in the secrecy analysis. Its basic idea can be highlighted
as follows: given Xn, if we independently produce 2nR random codevectors Y n, we will have
approximately 2nR−I(X
n;Y n) jointly typical pairs, i.e., the “excess” rate will determine the number
of jointly typical pairs. This lemma extends the basic idea of excess rate to multiple codebooks,
multiple conditioning, and furthermore, a generalization is made from a counting argument to
the entropy of the index of the codebook, which is essential for secrecy analysis.
Lemma 1. Consider random variables (Q,U0, V0, U1, V1, Z) distributed accord-
ing to p(q, u0, v0, u1, v1, z). Draw random sequences Q
n, Un0 , V
n
0 according to
February 26, 2019 DRAFT
6∏n
i=1 pQ(qi) pU0|Q(u0,i|qi) pV0|Q(v0,i|qi). Conditioned on U
n
0 , draw 2
nS i.i.d. copies of Un1
according to
∏n
i=1 pU1|U0(u1,i|u0,i), denoted U
n
1 (ℓ), ℓ ∈ J1, 2
nSK. Similarly, conditioned on V n0 ,
draw 2nT i.i.d. copies of V n1 according to
∏n
i=1 pV1|V0(v1,i|v0,i), denoted V
n
1 (k), k ∈ J1, 2
nT K.
Let L ∈ J1, 2nSK and K ∈ J1, 2nT K be random variables with arbitrary pmf. If
S > I(U1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + δ1(ǫ)
T > I(V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + δ1(ǫ)
S + T > I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + δ1(ǫ)
for a positive δ1(ǫ) and if for an arbitrary sequence Z
n,
P
(
(Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , U
n
1 (L), V
n
1 (K), Z
n) ∈ T (n)ǫ
) n→∞
−−−→ 1
there exists a positive δ2(ǫ)
ǫ→0
−−→ 0, such that for n sufficiently large
H(L,K|Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n, C) ≤ n(S + T − I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0)) + nδ2(ǫ). (4)
where C = {Un1 (1), . . . , U
n
1 (2
nS), V n1 (1), . . . , V
n
1 (2
nT )}.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.
This result is related to, and contains, [13, Lemma 1]. In particular, [13] considers a single-
input channel and explores the properties of codebooks driven by this input, while observing an
output Z. In contrast, this paper’s Lemma 1 develops a corresponding result for a multiple-access
channel with respect to Z, motivated by the two-transmitters present in the model of this paper.
This accounts for the new features of our Lemma 1, namely three rate constraints instead of one,
as well as monitoring the entropy of two index random variables instead of one. Furthermore, the
present result has one additional layer of conditioning to allow for indirect decoding of multiple
confidential messages in the sequel, while in [13] only one confidential message is decoded.
Remark 1. In addition to enabling the main results of this paper, Lemma 1 also has broader
implications on the necessity of prefixing in multi-transmitter secrecy problems [32] and deriving
the minimum amount of randomness needed to achieve secrecy. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner introduced
prefixing in [33] to expand the achievable rate region of the non-degraded broadcast channel with
confidential messages, a technique that was subsequently used in essentially the same manner in
multi-transmitter settings. Subsequently, Chia and El Gamal showed that in a single-transmitter
wiretap channel, prefixing can be replaced with superposition coding [13]. Appendix B extends
February 26, 2019 DRAFT
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from codebooks with certain size.
this concept to a multi-transmitter setting and presents an achievability technique for the multiple
access wiretap channel that utilizes minimal randomness and matches the best known achievable
rates without prefixing.
Theorem 1. An inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the two-transmitter two-receiver
channel with confidential messages is given by the set of non-negative rate pairs (R1, R2) such
that
R1 ≤ I(U0, U1; Y1|Q, V0, V1)− I(U0;Z|Q)− I(U1;Z|Q,U0, V0), (5)
R1 ≤ I(U0, U2; Y2|Q, V0, V2)− I(U0;Z|Q)− I(U2;Z|Q,U0, V0), (6)
R2 ≤ I(V0, V1; Y1|Q,U0, U1)− I(V0;Z|Q)− I(V1;Z|Q,U0, V0), (7)
R2 ≤ I(V0, V2; Y2|Q,U0, U2)− I(V0;Z|Q)− I(V2;Z|Q,U0, V0), (8)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U0, U1, V0, V1; Y1|Q)− I(U0, U1, V0, V1;Z|Q), (9)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U0, U2, V0, V2; Y2|Q)− I(U0, U2, V0, V2;Z|Q), (10)
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Fig. 3. Coding scheme for the first transmitter
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U0, U1; Y1|Q, V0, V1) + I(V0, V2; Y2|Q,U0, U2)
− I(U0, V0;Z|Q)− I(U1;Z|Q,U0, V0)− I(V2;Z|Q,U0, V0), (11)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0, V1; Y1|Q,U0, U1) + I(U0, U2; Y2|Q, V0, V2)
− I(U0, V0;Z|Q)− I(U2;Z|Q,U0, V0)− I(V1;Z|Q,U0, V0), (12)
for some
p(q)p(u0|q)p(u1, u2|u0)p(v0|q)p(v1, v2|v0)
p(x1|u0, u1, u2)p(x2|v0, v1, v2)p(y1, y2, z|x1, x2), (13)
such that
I(U1, U2, V1, V2;Z|U0, V0) ≤ I(U1, V1;Z|U0, V0)
+ I(U2, V2;Z|U0, V0)− I(U1;U2|U0)− I(V1;V2|V0). (14)
The proof uses superposition coding, Wyner’s wiretap coding, Marton coding, as well as
indirect decoding.
This result recovers several known earlier results:
• By setting Z = ∅, U0 = U1 = U2 = X1, and V0 = V1 = V2 = X2, the result in Theorem 1
reduces to the capacity region of compound multiple access channel discussed in [1].
• By setting Y2 = ∅ (or Y1 = ∅), U0 = U1 = U2 = X1 and V0 = V1 = V2 = X2, the result in
Theorem 1 reduces to the achievable rate region of multiple access wiretap channel without
common message [22]–[24].
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9• By setting X2 = ∅ (or X1 = ∅), U0 = U1 = U2, and Y2 = ∅ (or Y1 = ∅), the result in
Theorem 1 reduces to the capacity region of broadcast channel with confidential message
[34, Corollary 2].
• By setting X2 = ∅ (or X1 = ∅), the result in Theorem 1 reduces to the achievable rate
region for two-receiver, one-eavesdropper wiretap channel presented in [13, Theorem 1].
Remark 2. By doing some algebraic manipulation we can show that the constraint in (14) holds
only if
I(U1, V1;U2, V2|Q,U0, V0, Z) = 0. (15)
Corollary 1. An inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of degraded two-transmitter two-
receiver channel with confidential messages (Definition 5) is given by the set of non-negative
rate pairs (R1, R2) such that

R1 ≤ I(U0; Y2|V0, Q)− I(U0;Z|Q)
R2 ≤ I(V0; Y2|U0, Q)− I(V0;Z|Q)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U0, V0; Y2|Q)− I(U0;Z|Q)− I(V0;Z|Q)
(16)
for some
p(q)p(u0|q)p(v0|q)p(x1|u0)p(x2|v0). (17)
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 1 by setting U0 = U1 = U2 and V0 = V1 = V2 and
considering the fact that the channel is degraded.
IV. AN OUTER BOUND FOR THE DEGRADED MODEL
We develop an outer bound for the degraded version of the model and show an example where
it meets the inner bound (Theorem 1).
Definition 5. The degraded two-transmitter two-receiver channel with confidential messages
obeys:
p(y1, y2, z|x1, x2) = p(y1|x1, x2)p(y2|y1)p(z|y2). (18)
Theorem 2. The secrecy capacity region for the degraded two-transmitter two-receiver channel
with confidential messages is included in the set of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U0; Y2|Q)− I(U0;Z|Q), (19)
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R2 ≤ I(V0; Y2|Q)− I(V0;Z|Q), (20)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U0, V0; Y2|Q)− I(U0, V0;Z|Q), (21)
for some joint distribution
p(q)p(u0, v0|q)p(x1|u0)p(x2|v0). (22)
Proof. The proof is provided by the authors in [17, Section IV] and is omitted here for brevity.
Example (Degraded Switch Model): We consider an example of the two-transmitter two-
receiver channel where the first legitimate receiver has access to the noisy version of each of
the two transmitted values in a time-sharing (switched) manner, without interference from the
other transmitter (Fig. 4). The second legitimate receiver has access to a noisy version of the
first receiver, and the eavesdropper has access to a noisy version of the second receiver. The
switch channel state information is made available to all terminals. In this model the channel
outputs are as follows:
y′1 = (y1, s), (23)
y′2 = (y2, s), (24)
z′ = (z, s). (25)
This model consists of a channel with states that are causally available at both the encoders and
decoders.
The statistics of the channel, conditioned on the switch state, are expressed as follows:
p(y′1, y
′
2, z|x1, , x2, s) = p(y1|x1, x2, s) p(y2|y1, s) p(z|y2, s) (26)
The switch model describes, e.g., frequency hopping over two frequencies [29]. The state
(switch) is a binary random variable that chooses between listening to the Transmitter 1, with
probability τ , and listening to the Transmitter 2, with probability 1 − τ , independently at each
time slot. We further assume the state is i.i.d. across time.
p(y1|x1, x2, s) = p(y1|x1)1{s = 1}+ p(y1|x2)1{s = 2} (27)
where 1 is the indicator function.
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Theorem 3. The secrecy capacity region for the degraded switch two-transmitter two-receiver
channel with confidential messages, is given by the set of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U0; Y
′
2 |V0, Q)− I(U0;Z
′|Q), (28)
R2 ≤ I(V0; Y
′
2 |U0, Q)− I(V0;Z
′|Q), (29)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U0, V0; Y
′
2 |Q)− I(U0, V0;Z
′|Q), (30)
for some joint distribution
p(q)p(u0|q)p(v0|q)p(x1|u0)p(x2|v0). (31)
Proof. The proof is available in [17, Section IV].
V. A GENERAL OUTER BOUND
We now develop a general outer bound for the model of Fig. 1 and show an example in which
it meets the inner bound (Theorem 1).
Theorem 4. The secrecy capacity region for the two-transmitter two-receiver channel with
confidential messages is included in the set of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U0; Y1, Y2|Q)− I(U0;Z|Q), (32)
R2 ≤ I(V0; Y1, Y2|Q)− I(V0;Z|Q), (33)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U0, V0; Y1, Y2|Q)− I(U0, V0;Z|Q), (34)
for some joint distribution
p(q)p(u0, v0|q)p(x1|u0)p(x2|v0). (35)
Proof. The proof is available in [17, Section V].
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Example (Noiseless Switch Model): We consider an example of the two-transmitter two-
receiver channel in which the legitimate receivers as well as eavesdropper have access to the
noiseless version of each of the two transmitted values in a time-sharing (switched) manner,
without interference from the other transmitter (Fig. 5). This corresponds to a situation in which
transmitters operate on different spectral bands, while the receiving terminals have the capability
of operating on one adaptable (time-varying) band [29]. Here, it is assumed that both legitimate
receivers operate according to a common random switch s1 that is connected to Transmitter 1
with probability τ1 and to Transmitter 2 with probability 1− τ1, and the eavesdropper operates
according to another random switch s2 that is connected to Transmitter 1 with probability τ − 2
and to Transmitter 2 with probability 1− τ2. Aside from the switches, the channel is noiseless.
Both receivers and the eavesdropper have access to their own switch state information. Therefore
the channel outputs are considered as follows
y′1 = (y1, s1), (36)
y′2 = (y2, s1), (37)
z′ = (z, s2). (38)
February 26, 2019 DRAFT
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Since y1 = y2, we also have y
′
1 = y
′
2.
Theorem 5. The secrecy capacity region for the noiseless switch two-transmitter two-receiver
channel with confidential messages is given by the set of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ (τ1 − τ2)
+
H(X1), (39)
R2 ≤ (τ2 − τ1)
+
H(X2). (40)
Proof. The proof is available in [17, Section V].
Remark 3. The capacity region in Theorem 5 shows that transmitters can securely communicate
to receivers as long as τ1 6= τ2.
VI. STRONG SECRECY
Theorem 6. An inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the two-transmitter two-receiver
channel with confidential messages consists of the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) regions satis-
fying (48)-(59), (68), (71), (76), and non-negativity constraints for all rate variables, for some
distribution
p(q)p(u0, u1, u2|q)p(v0, v1, v2|q)p(x1|u0, u1, u2)p(x2|v0, v1, v2)p(y1, y2, z|x1, x2), (41)
Remark 4. It is customary to simplify the rate region constraints via the Fourier-Motzkin method
[35] to eliminate rate variables not associated with external messages; however, in the interest
of brevity we omit the 291 inequalities resulting from Fourier-Motzkin elimination. Subsequently,
a subset of this achievable rate region will be presented that enjoys a much simpler expression.
Proof. The achievability proof is inspired by [12], [36], and is based on solving the dual secret
key agreement problem in the so-called source model that includes shared randomness at all
terminals (see Fig. 6). In this dual model, rate constraints are derived so that the input and output
distributions of the dual model approximate that of the original model while satisfying reliability
and secrecy conditions in the dual model. The probability approximation then guarantees that
reliability and secrecy conditions can be achieved in the original model. Finally, it is shown that
there exists one realization of shared randomness for which the above mentioned are valid, thus
removing the necessity for common randomness.
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Fig. 6. Dual secret key agreement problem in the source model for the original problem.
We begin by developing the encoding and decoding strategies for the source model and the
original model, and derive and compare the joint probability distributions arising from these two
strategies.
We begin with the multi-terminal secret key agreement problem in the source model as depicted
in Fig. 6. Let (Un[0:2], V
n
[0:2], X
n
1 , X
n
2 , Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 , Z
n) be i.i.d. and distributed according to
p(u[0:2], x1)p(v[0:2], x2)p(y1, y2, z|x1, x2). (42)
Random Binning:
• To each and every un0 , uniformly and independently assign two random bin indices w1 ∈
J1, 2nR1K and f1 ∈ J1, 2
nR˜1K.
• To each pair (un0 , u
n
j ) for j = 1, 2 uniformly and independently assign random bin index
f ′j ∈ J1, 2
nR˜′jK.
• To each vn0 uniformly and independently assign two random bin indices w2 ∈ J1, 2
nR2K and
f2 ∈ J1, 2
nR˜2K.
• To each pair (vn0 , v
n
j ) for j = 1, 2 uniformly and independently assign random bin index
f ′′j ∈ J1, 2
nR˜′′j K.
• The random variables representing bin indices are:
F[1:2] , F
′
[1:2] , F
′′
[1:2] , W[1:2]. (43)
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• Decoder 1 is a Slepian-Wolf decoder observing (yn1 , f[1:2], f
′
1, f
′′
1 ), and producing (uˆ
n
0 , uˆ
n
1)
and (vˆn0 , vˆ
n
1 ), thus declaring wˆ1 = W1(uˆ
n
0 ) and wˆ2 = W2(vˆ
n
0 ) to be the estimate of the pair
(w1, w2).
• Decoder 2 is a Slepian-Wolf decoder observing (yn2 , f[1:2], f
′
2, f
′′
2 ), and producing (uˇ
n
0 , uˇ
n
2)
and (vˇn0 , vˇ
n
2 ), thus declaring the bin indices wˇ1 = W1(uˇ
n
0 ) and wˇ2 = W2(vˇ
n
0 ) as the estimate
of the pair (w1, w2).
To condense the notation, we define the following variables:
f ,
(
f[1:2], f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]
)
, (44)
uˆ ,
(
uˆn0 , uˇ
n
0 , uˆ
n
1 , uˇ
n
2 , vˆ
n
0 , vˇ
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 , vˇ
n
2
)
, (45)
Then, the random pmf induced by random binning is as follows:
P (un[0:2], v
n
[0:2], x
n
[1:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n, w[1:2], f , uˆ)
= p(un[0:2], v
n
[0:2], x
n
[1:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n)P (w[1:2], f[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 )P (f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]|u
n
[0:2], v
n
[0:2])
× P SW (uˆn0 , uˆ
n
1 , vˆ
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 |y
n
1 , f[1:2], f
′
1, f
′′
1 )P
SW (uˇn0 , uˇ
n
2 , vˇ
n
0 , vˇ
n
2 |y
n
2 , f[1:2], f
′
2, f
′′
2 )
= P (w[1:2], f[1:2], u
n
0 , v
n
0 )P (f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2], u
n
[1:2], v
n
[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 )
× p(xn1 |u
n
[0:2])p(x
n
2 |v
n
[0:2])p(y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn1 , x
n
2 )
× P SW (uˆn0 , uˆ
n
1 , vˆ
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 |y
n
1 , f[1:2], f
′
1, f
′′
1 )P
SW (uˇn0 , uˇ
n
2 , vˇ
n
0 , vˇ
n
2 |y
n
2 , f[1:2], f
′
2, f
′′
2 )
= P (w[1:2], f[1:2])P (u
n
0 , v
n
0 |w[1:2], f[1:2])P (f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 )P (u
n
[1:2], v
n
[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 , f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2])
× p(xn1 |u
n
[0:2])p(x
n
2 |v
n
[0:2])p(y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn1 , x
n
2 )
× P SW (uˆn0 , uˆ
n
1 , vˆ
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 |y
n
1 , f[1:2], f
′
1, f
′′
1 )P
SW (uˇn0 , uˇ
n
2 , vˇ
n
0 , vˇ
n
2 |y
n
2 , f[1:2], f
′
2, f
′′
2 ). (46)
P SW denotes the pmf of the output of the Slepian-Wolf decoder, which is a random pmf. Here
Wˆ1, Wˆ2 and Wˇ1, Wˇ2 are omitted because they are functions of other random variables.
We now return to the original problem, represented by Fig. 1, except that, in addition, a
genie provides all terminals with a shared randomness described by (F[1:2], F
′
[1:2], F
′′
[1:2]), whose
distribution will be clarified in the sequel. In this augmented model:
• The messagesW1,W2 are mutually independent and uniformly distributed with rates R1, R2
respectively. Also, shared randomness F1, F2 are uniformly distributed over J1, 2
nR˜1K and
J1, 2nR˜2K, independent of each other, and of W1,W2
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• Encoder 1 and 2 are stochastic encoders producing codewords Un0 , V
n
0 according to
distributions P (un0 |w[1:2], f[1:2]) and P (v
n
0 |w[1:2], f[1:2]), respectively, which are the marginals
of distribution P (un0 , v
n
0 |w[1:2], f[1:2]) appearing in (46). (Thus we are beginning to establish
the connection between the two models).
• The four random variables F ′[1:2], F
′′
[1:2] are mutually independent and uniformly distributed
over, respectively, J1, 2nR˜
′
1K and J1, 2nR˜
′
2K, J1, 2nR˜
′′
1 K and J1, 2nR˜
′′
2 K. They are also independent
of (Un0 , V
n
0 ) therefore they are independent of (W[1:2], F[1:2]).
• Encoder 1 and 2 further generate Un[1:2], V
n
[1:2] according to P (u
n
[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 , f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2])
and P (vn[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 , f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]), respectively, which are marginal distributions of
P (un[1:2], v
n
[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 , f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]) from (46).
• Encoder 1 generates Xn1 i.i.d. according to p(x1|u[0:2]). Encoder 2 generates X
n
2 i.i.d.
according to p(x2|v[0:2]). X1, X2 are transmitted over the channel.
• Decoders 1 and 2 are Slepian-Wolf decoders copied from the source model secret key
agreement problem, observing respectively (yn1 , f[1:2], f
′
1, f
′′
1 ) and (y
n
2 , f[1:2], f
′
2, f
′′
2 ), and
producing (uˆn0 , uˆ
n
1 , vˆ
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 ) and (uˇ
n
0 , uˇ
n
2 , vˇ
n
0 , vˇ
n
2 ). Therefore the following random PMFs for
the decoder output distributions are inherited from the source model:
P SW (uˆn0 , uˆ
n
1 , vˆ
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 |y
n
1 , f[1:2], f
′
1, f
′′
1 )
P SW (uˇn0 , uˇ
n
2 , vˇ
n
0 , vˇ
n
2 |y
n
2 , f[1:2], f
′
2, f
′′
2 )
• Decoders 1 and 2 then produce estimates of (W1,W2), which are denoted (Wˆ1, Wˆ2) and
(Wˇ1, Wˇ2) respectively.
The random pmf induced by the random binning and the encoding/decoding strategy is as follows:
Pˆ (un[0:2], v
n
[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n, w[1:2], f , uˆ)
= pU(w[1:2])p
U(f[1:2])P (u
n
0 , v
n
0 |w[1:2], f[1:2])p
U(f ′[1:2])p
U(f ′′[1:2])P (u
n
[1:2], v
n
[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 , f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2])
× p(xn1 |u
n
[0:2])p(x
n
2 |v
n
[0:2])p(y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn1 , x
n
2 )
× P SW (uˆn0 , uˆ
n
1 , vˆ
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 |y
n
1 , f[1:2], f
′
1, f
′′
1 )P
SW (uˇn0 , uˇ
n
2 , vˇ
n
0 , vˇ
n
2 |y
n
2 , f[1:2], f
′
2, f
′′
2 ). (47)
where f and uˆ are defined in (44) and (45), respectively,
We now find constraints that ensure that the pmfs Pˆ and P are close in total variation distance.
For the source model secret key agreement problem, substituting X1 = X2 ← U0, and X3 =
X4 ← V0, in [12, Theorem 1] implies that W[1:2] is nearly independent of F[1:2] and Z
n, if
R1 + R˜1 ≤ H(U0|Z), (48)
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R2 + R˜2 ≤ H(V0|Z), (49)
R1 + R˜1 +R2 + R˜2 ≤ H(U0, V0|Z), (50)
note that [12, Theorem 1] returns a total of 15 inequalities, but the remaining are redundant
because of (48)-(50). The above constraints imply that
P (zn, w[1:2], f[1:2]) ≈ p(z
n)pU(w[1:2])p
U(f[1:2]).
Similarly, substituting X1 ← (U0, U1), X2 ← (U0, U2), X3 ← (V0, V1), X4 ← (V0, V2), and
Z ← (U0, V0, Z) in [12, Theorem 1] implies that (f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]) are nearly mutually independent
and independent of (U0, V0, Z), therefore they are independent of (w[1:2], f[1:2]), if
R˜′j ≤ H(Uj |U0, V0, Z), (51)
R˜′′j ≤ H(Vj|U0, V0, Z), (52)
R˜′1 + R˜
′′
j ≤ H(U1, Vj|U0, V0, Z), (53)
R˜′2 + R˜
′′
j ≤ H(U2, Vj|U0, V0, Z), (54)
R˜′1 + R˜
′
2 ≤ H(U1, U2|U0, V0, Z), (55)
R˜′′1 + R˜
′′
2 ≤ H(V1, V2|U0, V0, Z), (56)
R˜′1 + R˜
′
2 + R˜
′′
j ≤ H(U1, U2, Vj|U0, V0, Z), (57)
R˜′j + R˜
′′
1 + R˜
′′
2 ≤ H(Uj , V1, V2|U0, V0, Z), (58)
R˜′1 + R˜
′
2 + R˜
′′
1 + R˜
′′
2 ≤ H(U1, U2, V1, V2|U0, V0, Z), (59)
for j = 1, 2. The above constraints imply
P (zn, un0 , v
n
0 , f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]) ≈ p(z
n, un0 , v
n
0 )p
U(f ′[1:2])p
U(f ′′[1:2]). (60)
Hence,
P (w[1:2], f[1:2]) = Pˆ (w[1:2], f[1:2]) = p
U(w[1:2])p
U(f[1:2]), (61)
P (f ′[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 ) = Pˆ (f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 ) = p
U(f ′[1:2])p
U(f ′′[1:2]). (62)
In other words, the inequalities (48)-(50) and (51)-(59) imply that
P (zn, w[1:2], f[1:2], f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]) ≈ p(z
n)pU(w[1:2])p
U(f[1:2])p
U(f ′[1:2])p
U(f ′′[1:2]). (63)
Here, the pmf P (zn) is equal to p(zn) because the marginal distribution does not include random
binning.
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Therefore, the distributions in (46) and (47) are equal, that is
P (un[0:2], v
n
[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n, w[1:2], f , uˆ) = Pˆ (u
n
[0:2], v
n
[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n, w[1:2], f , uˆ). (64)
For the Slepian-Wolf decoding of (Un0 , U
n
j ) and (V
n
0 , V
n
j ), we use the decodability constraints
from [12, Lemma 1] by substituting X1 ← U0, X2 ← (U0, Uj), X3 ← V0, X4 ← (V0, Vj):
R˜′j ≥ H(Uj |U0, V0, Vj, Yj), (65)
R˜′′j ≥ H(Vj |U0, Uj , V0, Yj), (66)
R˜′j + R˜
′′
j ≥ H(Uj , Vj|U0, V0, Yj), (67)
R˜1 + R˜
′
j ≥ H(U0, Uj |V0, Vj, Yj), (68)
R˜2 + R˜
′
j ≥ H(Uj |U0, V0, Vj, Yj), (69)
R˜1 + R˜
′′
j ≥ H(Vj |U0, Uj , V0, Yj), (70)
R˜2 + R˜
′′
j ≥ H(V0, Vj|U0, Uj , Yj), (71)
R˜1 + R˜
′
j + R˜
′′
j ≥ H(U0, Uj , Vj|V0, Yj), (72)
R˜1 + R˜
′
j + R˜2 ≥ H(U0, Uj |V0, Vj, Yj), (73)
R˜1 + R˜
′′
j + R˜2 ≥ H(V0, Vj|U0, Uj , Yj), (74)
R˜′j + R˜2 + R˜
′′
j ≥ H(Uj , V0, Vj |U0, Yj), (75)
R˜1 + R˜
′
j + R˜2 + R˜
′′
j ≥ H(U0, Uj , V0, Vj|Yj), (76)
for j = 1, 2. Note that [12, Lemma 1] returns 15 inequalities; we have omitted the ones that are
trivially redundant. In addition, inequalities (69), (70), (73), and (74) are redundant because of
(65), (66), (68), and (71), respectively. Moreover, inequalities (65), (66), and (67) are superfluous
because they refer to rates R˜′j, R˜
′′
j for codebooks that are not decoded (only participate in indirect
decoding of other codebooks). By the same argument (72), and (75) are also superfluous.
P (un[0:2], v
n
[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n, w[1:2], f , uˆ) ≈ P (u
n
[0:2], v
n
[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n, w[1:2], f)
× 1{uˆn0 = uˇ
n
0 = u
n
0 , uˆ
n
1 = u
n
1 , uˇ
n
2 = u
n
2}1{vˆ
n
0 = vˇ
n
0 = v
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 = v
n
1 , vˇ
n
2 = v
n
2}. (77)
From Equations (64), (77), and the triangle inequality,
Pˆ (un[0:2], v
n
[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n, w[1:2], f , uˆ) ≈ P (u
n
[0:2], v
n
[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n, w[1:2], f)
× 1{uˆn0 = uˇ
n
0 = u
n
0 , uˆ
n
1 = u
n
1 , uˇ
n
2 = u
n
2}1{vˆ
n
0 = vˇ
n
0 = v
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 = v
n
1 , vˇ
n
2 = v
n
2}. (78)
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For convenience, we reintroduce a Lemma from [12]:
Lemma 2. ( [12, Lemma 4]) Consider distributions pXn , pY n|Xn, qXn , qY n|Xn and random pmfs
PXn , PY n|Xn , QXn , QY n|Xn . Denoting asymptotic equality under total variation with ≈, we have:
1)
PXn ≈ QXn ⇒ PXnPY n|Xn ≈ QXnPY n|Xn (79)
PXnPY n|Xn ≈ QXnQY n|Xn ⇒ PXn ≈ QXn (80)
2) If pXnpY n|Xn ≈ qXnqY n|Xn , then there exists a sequence x
n ∈ X n such that
pY n|Xn=xn ≈ qY n|Xn=xn. (81)
3) If PXn ≈ QXn and PXnPY n|Xn ≈ PXnQY n|Xn , then
PXnPY n|Xn ≈ QXnQY n|Xn. (82)
Using Lemma 2, Equation (80), the marginal distributions of the two sides of (78) are
asymptotically equivalent, i.e.,
Pˆ (un[0:2], v
n
[0:2], z
n, w[1:2], f , uˆ) ≈ P (u
n
[0:2], v
n
[0:2], z
n, w[1:2], f)
× 1{uˆn0 = uˇ
n
0 = u
n
0 , uˆ
n
1 = u
n
1 , uˇ
n
2 = u
n
2}1{vˆ
n
0 = vˇ
n
0 = v
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 = v
n
1 , vˇ
n
2 = v
n
2}. (83)
Using Lemma 2, Equation (79) we multiply the two sides of Equation (83) by the conditional
distribution:
Pˆ (wˆ1, wˇ1, wˆ2, wˇ2|u
n
[0:2], v
n
[0:2], z
n, w[1:2], f , uˆ) =
1{W1(uˆ
n
0 ) = wˆ1,W1(uˇ
n
0 ) = wˇ1}1{W2(vˆ
n
0 ) = wˆ2,W2(vˇ
n
0 ) = wˇ2}
to get:
Pˆ (un[0:2], v
n
[0:2], z
n, w[1:2], f , uˆ, wˆ1, wˇ1, wˆ2, wˇ2) ≈ P (u
n
[0:2], v
n
[0:2], z
n, w[1:2], f)
× 1{uˆn0 = uˇ
n
0 = u
n
0 , uˆ
n
1 = u
n
1 , uˇ
n
2 = u
n
2}1{vˆ
n
0 = vˇ
n
0 = v
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 = v
n
1 , vˇ
n
2 = v
n
2 }
× 1{W1(uˆ
n
0) = wˆ1,W1(uˇ
n
0) = wˇ1}1{W2(vˆ
n
0 ) = wˆ2,W2(vˇ
n
0 ) = wˇ2}
= P (un[0:2], v
n
[0:2], z
n, w[1:2], f)
× 1{uˆn0 = uˇ
n
0 = u
n
0 , uˆ
n
1 = u
n
1 , uˇ
n
2 = u
n
2}1{vˆ
n
0 = vˇ
n
0 = v
n
0 , vˆ
n
1 = v
n
1 , vˇ
n
2 = v
n
2 }
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× 1{wˆ1 = wˇ1 = w1, wˆ2 = wˇ2 = w2}, (84)
where W1(u
n
0) = wˆ1 and W2(v
n
0 ) = wˆ2 denote the bins assigned to u
n
0 and v
n
0 , respectively.
Using (84) and Lemma 2, Equation (79) leads to
Pˆ (zn, w[1:2], f , wˆ1, wˇ1, wˆ2, wˇ2) ≈ P (z
n, w[1:2], f)1{wˆ1 = wˇ1 = w1, wˆ2 = wˇ2 = w2}, (85)
Using Equations (63) and (85) and Lemma 2, Equation (82) leads to
Pˆ (zn, w[1:2], f , wˆ1, wˇ1, wˆ2, wˇ2)
≈ p(zn)pU(w[1:2], f[1:2])p
U(f ′[1:2], f
′′
[1:2])1{wˆ1 = wˇ1 = w1, wˆ2 = wˇ2 = w2}. (86)
We now eliminate the shared randomness (F[1:2], F
′
[1:2], F
′′
[1:2]) without affecting the secrecy
and reliability requirements. By using Definition 4, Equation (86) ensures that there is a fixed
binning with corresponding pmf p that, if used in place of the random coding strategy P in (47),
it will induce the pmf pˆ as follows:
pˆ(zn, w[1:2], f[1:2], f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2], wˆ1, wˇ1, wˆ2, wˇ2)
≈ p(zn)pU(w[1:2], f[1:2])p
U(f ′[1:2], f
′′
[1:2])1{wˆ1 = wˇ1 = w1, wˆ2 = wˇ2 = w2}. (87)
Now, using Lemma 2, Equation (81) shows there exists an instance of (f[1:2], f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]) so that:
pˆ(zn, w[1:2], wˆ1, wˇ1, wˆ2, wˇ2|f[1:2], f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2])
≈ p(zn)pU(w1)p
U(w2)1{wˆ1 = wˇ1 = w1, wˆ2 = wˇ2 = w2}. (88)
This distribution satisfies the secrecy and reliability requirements as follows:
• Reliability: Using Lemma 2, Equation (80) leads to
pˆ(w[1:2], wˆ1,1, wˆ1,2, wˆ2,1, wˆ2,2|f[1:2], f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]) ≈ 1{wˆ1 = wˇ1 = w1, wˆ2 = wˇ2 = w2}, (89)
which is equivalent to:
pˆ
(
{(Wˆ1, Wˆ2) 6= (W1,W2)} ∪ {(Wˇ1, Wˇ2) 6= (W1,W2)}
∣∣∣∣f[1:2], f ′[1:2], f ′′[1:2]
)
→ 0.
• Security: Again, using Lemma 2, Equation (80)
pˆ(zn, w[1:2]|f[1:2], f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2]) ≈ p(z
n)pU(w1)p
U(w2). (90)
Finally, we identify p(xn1 |w1, f1, f
′
[1:2]) and p(x
n
2 |w2, f2, f
′′
[1:2]) (which is done by generating u[0:2]
and v[0:2] first, respectively) as encoders and the Slepian-Wolf decoders as decoders for the
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channel coding problem. These encoders and decoders lead to reliable and secure encoder and
decoders.
By applying a computer generated Fourier-Motzkin procedure to (48)-(59), (68), (71), and
(76) the achievable rate region for the strong secrecy regime in Theorem 6 are obtained [35].
This completes the proof.
Remark 5. If we assume that (14), and therefore (15), holds, the inequalities (53) for j = 2,
(54) for j = 1, and (55)-(59) will be redundant and by applying the Fourier-Motzkin procedure
to (48)-(52), (53) for j = 1, (54) for j = 2, (68), (71), and (76) the region in Theorem 1 over
the distribution (41) will be achieved. This shows that the region derived by OSRB is a superset
of the region derived in the weak secrecy regime.
Remark 6. The random distributions P (un0 , v
n
0 |w[1:2], f[1:2]) and P (u
n
[1:2], v
n
[1:2]|u
n
0 , v
n
0 , f
′
[1:2], f
′′
[1:2])
factorize as P (un0 |w1, f1)P (v
n
0 |w2, f2) and P (u
n
[1:2]|u
n
0 , f
′
[1:2])P (v
n
[1:2]|v
n
0 , f
′′
[1:2]), respectively, which
means, Encoders 1, 2 are not using the common randomness and the message available at the
other encoder to generate the common and private random variables. The common randomnesses
(F1, F
′
[1:2]) represent the realization of Encoder 1’s codebook and (F2, F
′′
[1:2]) represent the
realization of Encoder 2’s codebook, which is available at all terminals, but the codebook at
one encoder does not depend on the codebook of the other encoder.
Remark 7. The achievable region described in the proof of Theorem 6 was without time sharing,
i.e., Q = ∅. The convexity of this region is unclear, therefore it might be improved via time
sharing.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let N(Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n) = |{(k, ℓ) ∈ J1, 2nSK × J1, 2nT K : (Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , U
n
1 (k), V
n
1 (ℓ), Z
n) ∈
T
(n)
ǫ }|. Next, let define the following error events.
Let E1(Q
n, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n) = 1 if N(Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n) ≥ (1 + δ1(ǫ))2
n(S+T−I(U1,V1;Z|Q,U0,V0)+δ(ǫ))
and E1 = 0 otherwise.
Let E = 0 if (Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , U
n
1 (K), V
n
1 (L), Z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ and E1(Q
n, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n, K, L) = 0 and
E = 1 otherwise.
We now show that if S ≥ I(U1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + δ(ǫ), T ≥ I(V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + δ(ǫ), and
S + T ≥ I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + δ(ǫ), then P(E = 1)→ 0 as n→∞.
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By the union bound we have
P(E = 1) ≤ P
(
(Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , U
n
1 (K), V
n
1 (L), Z
n) /∈ T (n)ǫ
)
+ P
(
E1(Q
n, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n, K, L) = 1
)
.
(91)
The first term tends to zero by the main assumption of the Lemma.
We then partition the event {E1 = 1} based on the composition of the typical sequences
(Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , U
n
1 (k), V
n
1 (ℓ), Z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ :
• When all such typical sequences share the same Un1 (k), i.e., correspond to a single k.
• When all such typical sequences share the same V n1 (ℓ), i.e., correspond to a single ℓ.
• Neither of the above
As usual, each of the three partitioned E1 events gives rise to one rate constraint. We discuss
the first in detail; the remaining two follow similarly. Define A(Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , z
n) as the event
{E1(Q
n, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n) = 1} ∩ {Zn = zn},
P
(
E1(Q
n, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n) = 1
)
=
∑
(qn,un0 ,v
n
0 )∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(qn, un0 , v
n
0 )P
(
(E1(Q
n, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n) = 1)|Qn = qn, Un0 = u
n
0 , V
n
0 = v
n
0
)
=
∑
(qn,un0 ,v
n
0 )∈T
(n)
ǫ (Q,U0,V0)
zn∈T
(n)
ǫ (Z|Q,U0,V0)
p(qn, un0 , v
n
0 )P
(
A(qn, un0 , v
n
0 , z
n)|Qn = qn, Un0 = u
n
0 , V
n
0 = v
n
0
)
≤
∑
(qn,un0 ,v
n
0 )∈T
(n)
ǫ (Q,U0,V0)
p(qn, un0 , v
n
0 )
∑
zn∈T
(n)
ǫ (Z|Q,U0,V0)
P
(
(E1(q
n, un0 , v
n
0 , z
n) = 1)
|Qn = qn, Un0 = u
n
0 , V
n
0 = v
n
0
)
. (92)
Then,
P
(
E1(q
n, un0 , v
n
0 , z
n) = 1|Qn = qn, Un0 = u
n
0 , V
n
0 = v
n
0
)
=
P
(
N(qn, un0 , v
n
0 , z
n) ≥ (1 + δ1(ǫ))2
n(T−I(V1;Z|Q,U0,V0)+δ(ǫ))
)
. (93)
Define Xℓ = 1 if (q
n, un0 , v
n
0 , V
n
1 (ℓ), z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ and 0 otherwise. Here, Xℓ, ℓ ∈ J1, 2
nT K, are i.i.d.
Bernoulli-α random variables, where
2−n(I(V1;Z|Q,U0,V0)+δ(ǫ)) ≤ α ≤ 2−n(I(V1;Z|Q,U0,V0)−δ(ǫ))
Then
P
(
N(qn, un0 , v
n
0 , z
n) ≥ (1 + δ1(ǫ))2
n(T−I(V1;Z|Q,U0,V0)+δ(ǫ))
∣∣∣Qn = qn, Un0 = un0 , V n0 = vn0
)
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≤ P
( 2nT∑
ℓ=1
Xℓ ≥ (1 + δ1(ǫ))2
nTα
∣∣∣Qn = qn, Un0 = un0 , V n0 = vn0
)
. (94)
Applying the Chernoff Bound (e.g., see [37, Appendix B]), leads to
P

2
nT∑
ℓ=1
Xℓ ≥ (1 + δ1(ǫ))2
nTα
∣∣∣Qn = qn, Un0 = un0 , V n0 = vn0


≤ exp(−2nTαδ21(ǫ)/4)
≤ exp(−2n(T−I(V1;Z|Q,U0,V0)−δ(ǫ))δ21(ǫ)/4). (95)
Therefore,
P(E1(Q
n, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n) = 1)
≤
∑
(qn,un0 ,v
n
0 )∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(qn, un0 , v
n
0 )
∑
zn∈T
(n)
ǫ (Z|Q,U0,V0)
exp(−2n(T−I(V1;Z|Q,U0,V0)−δ(ǫ))δ21(ǫ)/4)
≤ 2n log |Z| exp(−2n(T−I(V1;Z|Q,U0,V0)−δ(ǫ))δ21(ǫ)/4), (96)
which tends to zero as n→∞ if T ≥ I(V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + δ(ǫ).
In a similar manner, the bounding of error probability for the second and third partition of
E1 (please see above) will give rise to the rate constraints S ≥ I(U1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + δ(ǫ), and
S + T ≥ I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + δ(ǫ), respectively. Details are ommited for brevity.
Finally, we bound H(L,K|Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n, C) as follows:
H(L,K,E|Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n, C)
≤ 1 + P(E = 1)H(L,K|E = 1, Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n, C) + P(E = 0)H(L,K|E = 0, Qn, Un0 , V
n
0 , Z
n, C)
≤ 1 + P(E = 1)n(S + T ) + log
(
(1 + δ1(ǫ))2
n(S+T−I(U1,V1;Z|Q,U0,V0)+δ(ǫ))
)
≤ n(S + T − I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + δ2(ǫ)). (97)
This completes the proof of the Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B
ACHIEVABLE RATE REGION FOR MAC-WTC UNDER RANDOMNESS CONSTRAINT
It is well-known that the transmitter (or transmitters) needs to use a stochastic encoding to
avoid the information about the transmitted confidential message to be leaked to an eavesdropper.
Here, a new achievability technique for characterizing the trade-off between the rate of the
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Channel
Enc. 1
Enc. 2
Dec.
Eve
W1
W2
Wˆ1, Wˆ2
W1,W2
Y n
Zn
Xn
1
Xn
2
A1
A2
Fig. 7. Multiple access wiretap channel
random number to realize the stochastic encoding and the communication rates in multiple
access wiretap channel, by employing a variation of superposition coding, is presented.
Consider a MAC-WTC (X1,X2, p(y, z|x1, x2),Y ,Z), in which X1, X2 are finite input alphabets
and Y and Z are finite output alphabets at legitimate receiver and the wiretapper, respectively
(as depicted in Fig. 7). In this problem, each transmitter sends a confidential message which is
supposed to be decoded by the legitimate receiver and must be kept secret from Eavesdropper.
Furthermore, for stochastic encoding, Encoder 1 and Encoder 2 are allowed to use a limited
amount of randomness. Thus, we are interested in the trade-off between the rate of randomness,
and the rates of confidential messages.
Definition 6. A (M1,n,M2,n, n) code for the considered model (Fig. 7) consists of the following:
i) Two message sets Wi = J1,Mi,nK, i = 1, 2, from which independent messages W1 and W2
are drawn uniformly distributed over their respective sets. Also, Two dummy message sets
Ai = J1,M
′
i,nK, i = 1, 2, from which independent dummy messages A1 and A2 are drawn
uniformly distributed over their respective sets.
ii) Deterministic encoders fi,n, i = 1, 2, are defined by function fi,n :Wi ×Ai → X
n
i .
iii) A decoding function φ : Yn → W1 ×W2 that assigns (wˆ1, wˆ2) ∈ J1,M1,nK × J1,M2,nK to
received sequence yn.
The probability of error is given by:
Pe
∆
= P
(
{(Wˆ1, Wˆ2) 6= (w1, w2)}
)
. (98)
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Definition 7 ( [31]). A quadruple (R1, Rd1 , R2, Rd2) is said to be achievable under weak
secrecy if there exists a sequence of (M1,n,M2,n,M
′
1,n,M
′
2,n, n) codes with M1,n ≥ 2
nR1 ,M2,n ≥
2nR2,M ′1,n ≤ 2
nRd1 ,M ′2,n ≤ 2
nRd2 , so that Pe
n→∞
−−→ 0 and
1
n
I(W1,W2;Z
n)
n→∞
−−→ 0. (99)
Theorem 7. An inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the multiple access wiretap
channel is given by the set of non-negative quadruple (R1, Rd1 , R2, Rd2) such that
R1 ≤ I(U ; Y |Q, V )− I(U ;Z|Q), (100)
R2 ≤ I(V ; Y |Q,U)− I(V ;Z|Q), (101)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V ; Y |Q)− I(U, V ;Z|Q), (102)
Rd1 ≥ I(U ;Z|Q) + I(X1;Z|Q,U, V ), (103)
Rd2 ≥ I(V ;Z|Q) + I(X2;Z|Q,U, V ), (104)
Rd1 +Rd2 ≥ I(U, V ;Z|Q) + I(X1, X2;Z|Q,U, V ), (105)
for some
p(q)p(u|q)p(v|q)p(x1|u)p(x2|v)p(y, z|x1, x2). (106)
Remark 8. By setting U = X1, V = X2, and by taking sufficiently large Rd1 and Rd2 , the result
in Theorem 7 reduces to the achievable rate region of multiple access wiretap channel without
common message [22]–[24].
Remark 9. By settingX2 = ∅ and V = ∅ (orX1 = ∅ and U = ∅), the result in Theorem 7 reduces
to the capacity rate region of broadcast channel with confidential messages under randomness
constraint in [16, Corollary 11].
Proof. Rate Splitting: Divide the dummy message A1 into independent dummy messages A1,1 ∈
J1, 2nR1,1K and A1,2 ∈ J1, 2
nR1,2K. Also, divide the dummy message A2 into independent dummy
messages A2,1 ∈ J1, 2
nR2,1K and A2,2 ∈ J1, 2
nR2,2K. Therefore, Rd1 = R1,1 + R1,2 and Rd2 =
R2,1 +R2,2.
Codebook Generation: Fix p(q), p(u|q), p(v|q), p(x1|u), p(x2|v), and ǫ > 0. Randomly and
independently generate a typical sequence qn according to p(qn) =
n∏
i=1
p(qi). We suppose that
all the terminals know qn.
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i) Generate 2n(R1+R1,1) sequences according to
∏n
i=1 pU |Q(ui|qi). Then, randomly bin these
2n(R1+R1,1) sequences into 2nR1 bins. We index these sequences as un(w1, a1,1). For each
(w1, a1,1), generate 2
nR1,2 codewords xn1 (w1, a1,1, a1,2) each according to
∏n
i=1 pX1|U(x1,i|ui).
ii) Generate 2n(R2+R2,1) sequences according to
∏n
i=1 pV |Q(vi|qi). Then, randomly bin these
2n(R2+R2,1) sequences into 2nR2 bins. We index these sequences as vn(w2, a2,1). For each
(w2, a2,1), generate 2
nR2,2 codewords xn1 (w2, a2,1, a2,2) each according to
∏n
i=1 pX2|V (x2,i|vi).
Encoding: To send the message w1, the Encoder 1 splits a1 into (a1,1, a1,2), and chooses
un(w1, a1,1). Then it chooses codeword x
n
1 (w1, a1,1, a1,2) and send it over the channel.
To send the message w2, the Encoder 2 splits a2 into (a2,1, a2,2), and chooses v
n(w2, a2,1).
Then it chooses codeword xn2 (w2, a2,1, a2,2) and send it over the channel.
Decoding and Error Probability Analysis:
• Decoder decodes (w1, w2) by finding a unique pair (w1, w2) such that
(qn, un(w1, a1,1), v
n(w2, a2,1), y
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ (pU,V,Y ) for some (a1,1, a2,1). The probability of
error for Receiver goes to zero as n→∞ if we choose [37]
R1 +R1,1 ≤ I(U ; Y |Q, V )− ǫ, (107)
R2 +R2,1 ≤ I(V ; Y |Q,U)− ǫ, (108)
R1 +R1,1 +R2 +R2,1 ≤ I(U, V ; Y |Q)− ǫ. (109)
Equivocation Calculation: We analyze mutual information between (W1,W2) and Z
n, aver-
aged over all random codebooks
I(W1,W2;Z
n|Qn, C)
= I(W1,W2, A1,1, A1,2, A2,1, A2,2;Z
n|Qn, C)− I(A1,1, A1,2, A2,1, A2,2;Z
n|W1,W2, Q
n, C)
(a)
= I(W1,W2, A1,1, A1,2, A2,1, A2,2, X
n
1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn, C)− I(A1,1, A1,2, A2,1, A2,2;Z
n|W1,W2, Q
n, C)
(b)
= I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn, C)− I(A1,1, A1,2, A2,1, A2,2;Z
n|W1,W2, Q
n, C)
= I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn, C)− I(A1,1, A2,1;Z
n|W1,W2, Q
n, C)
− I(A1,2, A2,2;Z
n|W1,W2, A1,1, A1,2, Q
n, C)
= I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn, C)−H(A1,1, A2,1|W1,W2, Q
n, C) +H(A1,1, A2,1|W1,W2, Z
n, Qn, C)
−H(A1,2, A2,2|W1,W2, A1,1, A2,1, Q
n, C) +H(A1,2, A2,2|W1,W2, A1,1, A2,1, Z
n, Qn, C)
(110)
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where (a) is due to Xn1 and X
n
2 are deterministic functions of (W1, A1,1, A1,2) and
(W2, A2,1, A2,2), respectively. Also, (b) is due to the fact that, given X
n
1 and X
n
2 , the indices
W1, W2, A1,1, A1,2 ,A2,1, and A2,2 are uniquely determined.
The first term in (110) is bounded as:
I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn, C) ≤ nI(X1, X2;Z|Q) + nǫ, (111)
where ǫ
n→∞
−−→ 0 similar to [37].
For the second term in (110) we have
H(A1,1, A2,1|W1,W2, Q
n, C) = n(R1,1 +R2,1). (112)
For the third term, substituting U0 ← Q, V0 ← Q, U1 ← U , and V1 ← V in Lemma 1 result
that if p
(
(Qn, Un(W1, A1,1), V
n(W2, A2,1), Z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ
) n→∞
−−→ 1 and
R1,1 ≥ I(U ;Z|Q) + ǫ, (113)
R2,1 ≥ I(V ;Z|Q) + ǫ, (114)
R1,1 +R2,1 ≥ I(U, V ;Z|Q) + ǫ. (115)
Then,
H(A1,1, A2,1|W1,W2, Z
n, Qn, C) ≤ n(R1,1 +R2,1 − I(U, V ;Z|Q) + ǫ). (116)
Here, this condition holds because
p
(
(Qn, Un(W1, A1,1), X
n
1 (W1, A1,1, A1,2), V
n(W2, A2,1), X
n
2 (W2, A2,1, A2,2), Z
n) ∈ T (n)ǫ
) n→∞
−−→ 1.
(117)
Now, we bound the fourth term in (110),
H(A1,2, A2,2|W1,W2, A1,1, A2,1, Q
n, C) = n(R1,2 +R2,2). (118)
Now, we bound the last term in (110) by applying Lemma 1,
H(A1,2, A2,2|W1,W2, A1,1, A2,1, Z
n, Qn, C) ≤ n(R1,2 +R2,2 − I(X1, X2;Z|Q,U, V ) + ǫ),
(119)
if (117) holds and
R1,2 ≥ I(X1;Z|Q,U, V ) + ǫ, (120)
R2,2 ≥ I(X2;Z|Q,U, V ) + ǫ, (121)
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R1,2 +R2,2 ≥ I(X1, X2;Z|Q,U, V ) + ǫ. (122)
Substituting (111), (112), (116), (118), and (119) into (110) yields
I(W1,W2;Z
n|Qn, C) ≤ nI(X1, X2;Z|Q)− n(R1,1 +R2,1)
+ n(R1,1 +R2,1 − I(U, V ;Z|Q) + ǫ)− n(R1,2 +R2,2)
+ n(R1,2 +R2,2 − I(X1, X2;Z|Q,U, V ) + ǫ). (123)
Therefore I(W1,W2;Z
n|Qn, C) ≤ 2nǫ. By applying the Fourier-Motzkin procedure [35] to (107)-
(109), (113)-(115), (120)-(122), Rd1 = R1,1 +R1,2, and Rd2 = R2,1 +R2,2 we obtain the region
in Theorem 7. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The coding scheme is based on superposition coding, Wyner’s random binning [38], Marton
coding, and applying indirect decoding [13].
The random code generation is as follows:
Fix p(q), p(u0|q), p(u1, u2|u0), p(v0|q), p(v1, v2|v0), p(x1|u0, u1, u2), p(x2|v0, v1, v2), ǫ1 <
min{ǫ′, ǫ′′}, and ǫ2 < min{ǫ
′, ǫ′′}.
Codebook Generation: Randomly and independently generate a typical sequence qn according
to p(qn) =
n∏
i=1
p(qi). We suppose that all the terminals know q
n.
i) Generate 2nR˜1 codewords un0(ℓ0) each according to
∏n
i=1 pU0|Q(u0,i|qi). Then, randomly bin
the 2nR˜1 codewords into 2nR1 bins, B(w1), w1 ∈ J1, 2
nR1K. For each ℓ0, generate 2
nT1
codewords un1 (ℓ0, t1) each according to
∏n
i=1 pU1|U0(u1,i|u0,i). Then, randomly bin the 2
nT1
codewords into 2nR
′
1 bins, B(ℓ0, ℓ1), ℓ1 ∈ J1, 2
nR′1K. Similarly, for each ℓ0, generate 2
nT2
codewords un2 (ℓ0, t2) each according to
∏n
i=1 pU2|U0(u2,i|u0,i). Then, randomly bin the 2
nT2
codewords into 2nR
′′
1 bins, B(ℓ0, ℓ2), ℓ2 ∈ J1, 2
nR′′1 K.
ii) Similarly, generate 2nR˜2 codewords vn0 (ℓ
′
0) each according to
∏n
i=1 pV0|Q(v0,i|qi). Then,
randomly bin the 2nR˜2 codewords into 2nR2 bins, B(w2), w2 ∈ J1, 2
nR2K. For each ℓ′0,
generate 2nS1 codewords vn1 (ℓ
′
0, s1) each according to
∏n
i=1 pV1|V0(v1,i|v0,i). Then, randomly
bin the 2nS1 codewords into 2nR
′
2 bins, B(ℓ′0, ℓ
′
1), ℓ
′
1 ∈ J1, 2
nR′2K. Similarly, for each ℓ′0,
generate 2nS2 codewords vn2 (ℓ
′
0, s2) each according to
∏n
i=1 pV2|V0(v2,i|v0,i). Then, randomly
bin the 2nS2 codewords into 2nR
′′
2 bins, B(ℓ′0, ℓ
′
2), ℓ
′
2 ∈ J1, 2
nR′′2 K.
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Encoding: To send the message w1, the encoder f1 first uniformly chooses index L0 ∈ B(w1).
Then, it uniformly chooses a pair of indices (L1, L2) and selects a jointly typical sequence pair
(un1(L0, t1(L0, L1)), u
n
2(L0, t2(L0, L1))) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ1 (U1, U2|U0) in the product bin. If the encoder f1
finds more than one such pair, then it chooses one of them uniformly at random. We have an error
if there is no such pair, in which the encoder f1 uniformly at random chooses t1 ∈ B(L0, L1),
t2 ∈ B(L0, L2). The error probability of the last event approaches to zero as n→∞, if [39]
R′1 +R
′′
1 ≤ T1 + T2 − I(U1;U2|U0)− ǫ1. (124)
Finally, the encoder f1 generates a sequence X
n
1 at random according to∏n
i=1 p(x1,i|u0,i, u1,i, u2,i). Encoder 2 proceeds similarly to encode w2 and sends
codeword Xn2 . The probability of not finding a jointly typical sequence pair
(vn1 (L
′
0, s1(L
′
0, L
′
1)), v
n
2 (L
′
0, s2(L
′
0, L
′
1))) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ2 (V1, V2|V0) in the product bin approaches
to zero as n→∞, if [39]
R′2 +R
′′
2 ≤ S1 + S2 − I(V1;V2|V0)− ǫ2. (125)
Decoding and Error Probability Analysis:
• Receiver 1 decodes (L0, L
′
0) and therefore (w1, w2) indirectly by finding a unique pair
(ℓˆ0, ℓˆ
′
0) such that (q
n, un0(ℓˆ0), u
n
1(ℓˆ0, t1), v
n
0 (ℓˆ
′
0), v
n
1 (ℓˆ
′
0, s1), y
n
1 ) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ′ (U0, U1, V0, V1, Y1) for
some t1 ∈ J1, 2
nT1K and s1 ∈ J1, 2
nS1K. The idea of indirect decoding for the situation that
there is just one transmitter is shown in Fig. 8. The probability of error for Receiver 1 goes
to zero as n→∞ if we choose [37]
R˜1 + T1 ≤ I(U0, U1; Y1|Q, V0, V1)− ǫ
′, (126)
R˜2 + S1 ≤ I(V0, V1; Y1|Q,U0, U1)− ǫ
′, (127)
R˜1 + T1 + R˜2 + S1 ≤ I(U0, U1, V0, V1; Y1|Q)− ǫ
′. (128)
• Similarly Receiver 2 decodes (L0, L
′
0) and therefore (w1, w2) indirectly by finding a unique
pair (ℓˇ0, ℓˇ
′
0) such that (q
n, un0(ℓˇ0), u
n
2(ℓˇ0, t2), v
n
0 (ℓˇ
′
0), v
n
2 (ℓˇ
′
0, s2), y
n
2 ) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ′′ (U0, U2, V0, V2, Y2)
for some t2 ∈ J1, 2
nT2K and s2 ∈ J1, 2
nS2K. The probability of error for Receiver 1 goes to
zero as n→∞ if we choose [37]
R˜1 + T2 ≤ I(U0, U2; Y2|Q, V0, V2)− ǫ
′′, (129)
R˜2 + S2 ≤ I(V0, V2; Y2|Q,U0, U2)− ǫ
′′, (130)
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yn1
•
yn2
(un0 (1), u
n
1 (1, t1), y
n
1 ) ∈ T
(n)
ε
t1 ∈ J1, 2
nT1K
(un0 (1), u
n
2 (1, t2), y
n
2 ) ∈ T
(n)
ε
t2 ∈ J1, 2
nT2K
Fig. 8. Indirect decoding for un0 (1) via u
n
1 (1, t1) and u
n
2 (1, t2) for the situation that there is just one transmitter.
R˜1 + T2 + R˜2 + S2 ≤ I(U0, U2, V0, V2; Y2|Q)− ǫ
′′. (131)
Equivocation Calculation: We analyze mutual information between (W1,W2) and Z
n, averaged
over all random codebooks
I(W1,W2;Z
n|Qn, C)
= I(W1,W2, L0, T1, T2, L
′
0, S1, S2;Z
n|Qn, C)− I(L0, T1, T2, L
′
0, S1, S2;Z
n|W1,W2, Q
n, C)
(a)
≤ I(Un0 , U
n
1 , U
n
2 , V
n
0 , V
n
1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn, C)− I(L0, L
′
0;Z
n|W1,W2, Q
n, C)
− I(T1, T2, S1, S2;Z
n|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)
= I(Un0 , U
n
1 , U
n
2 , V
n
0 , V
n
1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn, C)−H(L0, L
′
0|W1,W2, Q
n, C)
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+H(L0, L
′
0|Z
n,W1,W2, Q
n, C)− I(T1, T2, S1, S2;Z
n|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C), (132)
where (a) is due to the data processing inequality. Here, T1, T2, S1, and S2 are deterministic
functions of (L0, L1), (L0, L2), (L
′
0, L
′
1), and (L
′
0, L
′
2), respectively.
The first term in (132) is bounded as:
I(Un0 , U
n
1 , U
n
2 , V
n
0 , V
n
1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn, C) ≤ nI(U0, U1, U2, V0, V1, V2;Z|Q) + nǫ, (133)
as n→∞ where ǫ→ 0 similar to [37].
For the second term in (132) we have
H(L0, L
′
0|W1,W2, Q
n, C) = n(R˜1 − R1 + R˜2 −R2). (134)
For the third term, substituting U0 = Q, V0 = Q, U1 = U0, and V1 = V0 in Lemma 1 result
that. If p
(
(Qn, Un0 (L0), V
n
0 (L
′
0), Z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ
)
→ 1 as n → ∞ and R˜1 − R1 ≥ I(U0;Z|Q) + ǫ,
R˜2 −R2 ≥ I(V0;Z|Q) + ǫ, and R˜1 − R1 + R˜2 −R2 ≥ I(U0, V0;Z|Q) + ǫ. Then,
H(L0, L
′
0|Z
n,W1,W2, Q
n, C) ≤ n(R˜1 − R1 + R˜2 −R2 − I(U0, V0;Z|Q) + ǫ), (135)
Here, this condition holds because
p
(
(Qn, Un0 (L0), U
n
1 (L0, t1(L0, L1)), U
n
2 (L0, t2(L0, L1)), V
n
0 (L
′
0), V
n
1 (L
′
0, s1(L
′
0, L
′
1))
, V n2 (L
′
0, s2(L
′
0, L
′
1)), Z
n) ∈ T (n)ǫ
)
→ 1 (136)
as n→∞. Now, we bound the last term in (132)
I(T1, T2, S1, S2;Z
n|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)
= H(T1, T2, S1, S2|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)−H(T1, T2, S1, S2|Z
n, L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)
(a)
= H(T1, T2, S1, S2, L1, L2, L
′
1, L
′
2|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)−H(T1, T2, S1, S2|Z
n, L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)
≥ H(L1, L2, L
′
1, L
′
2|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)−H(T1, S1|Z
n, L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)−H(T2, S2|Z
n, L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)
(b)
=H(L1, L2|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C) +H(L′1, L
′
2|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)
−H(T1, S1|Z
n, L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)−H(T2, S2|Z
n, L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C), (137)
where (a) is due to given the codebook C and (L0, L
′
0), (L1, L2, L
′
1, L
′
2) is a deterministic
function of (T1(L0, L1), T2(L0, L2), S1(L
′
0, L
′
1), S2(L
′
0, L
′
2)), and (b) holds due to the fact that
given (L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C), (L1, L2) and (L
′
1, L
′
2) are independent. Now,
H(L1, L2|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C) = n(R′1 +R
′′
1), (138)
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H(L′1, L
′
2|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C) = n(R′2 +R
′′
2), (139)
H(T1, S1|Z
n, L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)
(a)
≤ n(T1 + S1 − I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + ǫ), (140)
H(T2, S2|Z
n, L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)
(b)
≤ n(T2 + S2 − I(U2, V2;Z|Q,U0, V0) + ǫ), (141)
where (a) is due to the following. Consider,
H(T1, S1|Z
n, L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C) = H(T1, S1|U
n
0 (L0), V
n
0 (L
′
0), Z
n, L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)
≤ H(T1, S1|U
n
0 (L0), V
n
0 (L
′
0), Z
n, Qn, C).
Now we upper bound the term H(T1, S1|U
n
0 (L0), V
n
0 (L
′
0), Z
n, Qn, C). From (136) we have
p
(
(Qn, Un0 (L0), U
n
1 (L0, t1(L0, L1)), V
n
0 (L
′
0), V
n
1 (L
′
0, s1(L
′
0, L
′
1)), Z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ
)
→ 1 as n → ∞.
Applying Lemma 1 leads to,
H(T1, S1|U
n
0 (L0), V
n
0 (L
′
0), Z
n, Qn, C) ≤ n(T1 + S1 − I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + ǫ), (142)
if T1 ≥ I(U1;Z|Q,U0, V0)+ǫ, S1 ≥ I(V1;Z|Q,U0, V0)+ǫ, and T1+S1 ≥ I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0)+
ǫ. By the same argument the inequality (b) holds, if the following inequalities hold,
T2 ≥ I(U2;Z|Q,U0, V0) + ǫ,
S2 ≥ I(V2;Z|Q,U0, V0) + ǫ,
T2 + S2 ≥ I(U2, V2;Z|Q,U0, V0) + ǫ,
Substituting (138)-(141) into (137) leads to,
I(T1, T2, S1, S2;Z
n|L0, L
′
0, Q
n, C)
≥ n(R′1 +R
′′
1) + n(R
′
2 +R
′′
2)− n(T1 + S1 − I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + ǫ)
− n(T2 + S2 − I(U2, V2;Z|Q,U0, V0) + ǫ). (143)
Substituting (133)-(135) and (143) into (132) yields
I(W1,W2;Z
n|Qn, C) ≤ nI(U0, U1, U2, V0, V1, V2;Z|Q)− n(R˜1 − R1 + R˜2 − R2)
+ n(R˜1 −R1 + R˜2 − R2 − I(U0, V0;Z|Q))− n(R
′
1 +R
′′
1)− n(R
′
2 +R
′′
2)
+ n(T1 + S1 − I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + ǫ) + n(T2 + S2 − I(U2, V2;Z|Q,U0, V0) + ǫ). (144)
Therefore I(W1,W2;Z
n|Qn, C) ≤ nǫ if
I(U1, U2, V1, V2;Z|U0, V0)−R
′
1 − R
′′
1 − R
′
2 −R
′′
2 + T1 + S1 − I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0)
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+ T2 + S2 − I(U2, V2;Z|Q,U0, V0) ≤ ǫ. (145)
As a result, the rate constraints derived in equivocation analysis are
R˜1 − R1 + R˜2 − R2 ≥ I(U0, V0;Z|Q), (146)
R˜1 − R1 ≥ I(U0;Z|Q), (147)
R˜2 − R2 ≥ I(V0;Z|Q), (148)
T1 + S1 ≥ I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0), (149)
T1 ≥ I(U1;Z|Q,U0, V0), (150)
S1 ≥ I(V1;Z|Q,U0, V0), (151)
T2 + S2 ≥ I(U2, V2;Z|Q,U0, V0), (152)
T2 ≥ I(U2;Z|Q,U0, V0), (153)
S2 ≥ I(V2;Z|Q,U0, V0), (154)
T1 + S1 + T2 + S2 − R
′
1 − R
′′
1 −R
′
2 − R
′′
2 ≤ I(U1, V1;Z|Q,U0, V0) + I(U2, V2;Z|Q,U0, V0)
− I(U1, U2, V1, V2;Z|U0, V0). (155)
Finally, by applying the Fourier-Motzkin procedure [35] to (124)-(131) and (146)-(155) we obtain
the inequalities in Theorem 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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